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To protect Lake Taupo, the Waikato Regional Council proposes nutrient trading. Although we 
agree that trading is best way to protect the environment, we believe the proposal could be 
improved. A failure could tarnish the wide potential for environmental market solutions. 
The Waikato Regional Plan proposes to “permit the transfer of nitrogen allowances around the 
catchment of Lake Taupo, by ensuring any increases in nitrogen leaching are offset by 
corresponding and equivalent reductions in nitrogen leaching within the Lake Taupo catchment”. 
The trading process will start with an initial allocation of discharge rights among users. Users can 
then decide to buy or sell rights based on their intended land use. As the regional plan states, an 
increase by one buyer should be offset by curbs elsewhere.  
We have two main concerns with this plan.  
First, transaction costs will be too high. A potential buyer who wants to convert land from forest 
to dairy use must find someone who is willing to sell, and in the right quantity. Determining the 
quantity requires looking up the “exchange rate” for, say, X cows versus Y hectares in forest. If 
the seller were unwilling to sell enough credits to offset the buyer’s needs, the buyer would have 
to look for additional sellers.  
The users then have to negotiate a price, which will be challenging because no price records will 
be published. Without advance price information, a single failed deal may put off a user from 
trying to trade again. If the users manage to agree on price and quantity, they then submit their 
proposed trade to council for approval, which might deny the trade because of, say, impacts to a 
particular stream. When it succeeds, this search, calculate, negotiate, and approve process would 
take weeks. The problem is made worse by the relatively low number of users who are in the 
market in the first place. The combination of high transaction costs and few users is likely to 
result in very little market activity. 
Second, in trying to reduce transaction costs, the proposal cuts corners on the hydrology. To 
relate discharges to lake concentration, hydrologists estimate a “transport coefficient,” which is 
the effect from a discharge now on nitrate in the lake in a future year. These coefficients are 
uncertain, but the council has tools to estimate them. This hydrological science has not been (and 
probably cannot be) translated correctly into the existing market proposal. Instead, the proposed 
market uses crude “lag zones” where every user is considered the same, and can trade one-to-one 
with each other. Discharges reaching the lake in different years are bunched together as though 
they arrived in the same year. The proposed number of zones for Lake Taupo is just one; all 
users are assumed to have equal effects, differing only by land use. 
Pooling over time and space lets users trade who really shouldn’t. Some users will enjoy a “free 
ride” while others will pay more than their fair share. For example, if damage from farmer A’s X 
cows were than more his exchange rate implied, then farmer A would not pay the full amount. 
Other people may find this unfair. When the matter ends up in court, the standard will be, “Did 
you do the reasonable best you could with the data you had available at the time?” And the 
answer will be, “No, we had to cut corners to reduce the transaction costs.” 
Fortunately, a solution is at hand. Over the past twenty years, new types of market mechanisms 
have been developed where trades are cleared with the help of computerised models based on 
operations research. These new mechanisms are called “smart markets.” Smart markets and the 
related economic discipline of mechanism design have been studied by recent Nobel Prize 
winners. While new for water discharges, smart markets are already in use here and around the 
world. The spot market for electricity is an example. For goods and services that require co-
ordination, smart markets result in better economic gains and societal outcomes compared to 
traditional market mechanisms. 
A smart market for nutrients would not be a “free market,” but would instead be a controlled 
auction in which all environmental effects are taken into account. By using the computer system 
to clear the market, the council would automate the approval process. 
Users would not need to search for trading partners. Instead, they would make offers and bids to 
an online auction, similar to TradeMe but with more computation under the bonnet. The 
computer would calculate trades to maximise benefit to users, finding the lowest price which 
matched supply to demand, properly weighted by the transport coefficients. 
The market mechanism simplifies into a periodic internet auction, and the transaction cost goes 
nearly to zero. The low transaction cost would allow government or anyone to buy credits 
through the auction at a fair price to improve the catchment. All traders could have their search, 
calculate, negotiate, and approval done in not weeks, but an hour. 
By creating a central place for users to trade, a smart market further allows the benefits of a 
modern options exchange: parties are anonymous, the auction manager enforces regulations to 
ensure fairness and transparency, and markets are orderly. A few tentative auctions could be run 
to allow price discovery before the conclusive sale. Historical prices would be posted, so users 
would have a forecast of the likely price. Price data will make planning easier for all concerned. 
At the same time, all available hydrological science is used without cutting corners. Every trade 
would be simulated to ensure that it had the expected effect. The computer would allow trading 
only within the desired environmental outcomes. Thus, the hydrological complexity is 
encapsulated in a device that manages complexity easily – a computer. The prudential standard is 
satisfied – “Did you do the reasonable best you could with the available data?” The answer is a 
resounding yes. New Zealand generally needs more hydrological study; the smart market would 
make better use of whatever data is available. 
The regional councils are good candidates to operate the smart market, but this is not a 
requirement. The regional council could contract market operation to a private firm, while 
maintaining full oversight. 
As well as nutrient trading, we are studying smart markets for water quantity, and believe they 
should be considered more fully. 
The move to nutrient trading is to be applauded. A market approach is the best way to improve 
our treasured waters while maximising benefit for users. The Waikato plan correctly identifies 
these gains. However, a successful market design must have low transaction costs and the correct 
science to satisfy the environmental outcomes at least cost to society. A failure of this market 
could negatively impact the perception of any market solution to environmental problems. A 
mid-course correction is warranted for the proposed market. 
